Wrong Turn

A searing indictment of US strategy in Afghanistan from a distinguished military leader and West Point military historian-&quote;A remarkable book&quote; (National Review). In 2008, Col. Gian Gentile exposed a growing rift among military intellectuals with an article titled &quote;Misreading the Surge Threatens U.S. Army's Conventional Capabilities,&quote; that appeared in World Politics Review. While the years of US strategy in Afghanistan had been dominated by the doctrine of counterinsurgency (COIN), Gentile and a small group of dissident officers and defense analysts began to question the necessity and efficacy of COIN essentially armed nation-building in achieving the United States' limited core policy objective in Afghanistan: the destruction of Al Qaeda. Drawing both on the author's experiences as a combat battalion commander in the Iraq War and his research into the application of counterinsurgency in a variety of historical contexts, Wrong Turn is a brilliant summation of Gentile's views of the failures of COIN, as well as a trenchant reevaluation of US operations in Afghanistan. &quote;Gentile is convinced that Obama's 'surge' in Afghanistan can't work. . . . And, if Afghanistan doesn't turn around soon, the Democrats . . . who have come to embrace the Petraeus-Nagl view of modern warfare . . . may find themselves wondering whether it's time to go back to the drawing board.&quote; The New Republic